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Abstract.  Access to knowledge and technology is necessary for the proper functioning of a competitive 
economy. The fastest and most efficient way to obtain and relay information is through the use of elec-
tronic media, particularly the Internet. Therefore nation-states should take steps to ensure the free flow of 
information and fair access to it through the Internet. One of the means to achieve this goal is net neutrali-
ty – a regulation, mandating the equal treatment of all sites, platforms and services available on the Web. 
For the purposes of this paper, achievements of the school of law and economics have been utilized, the 
behavioural method in particular. The method is used to examine legal rules through the prism of expected so-
cial response, i.e. behaviour of addressees of the rule being analyzed, with the assumption that they are guided 
by a rational desire to fulfill their own economic interests to the fullest extent possible. The author reviewed the 
arguments presented in scholarly literature, put forward by representatives of economic, legal and IT sciences, 
both opponents, as well as advocates of net neutrality. An emphasis was put on arguments taking the traits of 
the Internet as a two-sided market into account. The critical analysis of the aforementioned arguments has led 
the author to the conclusion, that abandoning the principle of net neutrality creates conditions for companies 
that are favoured by Internet Service Providers to become more competitive in an undeserved manner. 
This increase in competitiveness would not involve a higher quality of services or a lower price, so it would 
be detrimental to consumers. As a consequence, new monopolies may be created or existing ones may 
become more entrenched. Net neutrality was on the books in the USA from 2015 to 2017, based on  
a regulation issued by the FCC. This regulation was recently repealed.  
Keywords: net neutrality, two-sided market, competetiveness, monopoly, Federal Communications 
Commission 
 
Streszczenie .  Dla prawidłowego funkcjonowania konkurencyjnej gospodarki konieczny jest dostęp do 
wiedzy i technologii. Najszybszym i najbardziej efektywnym sposobem pozyskiwania informacji są media 
elektroniczne, w szczególności Internet. Państwa powinny zapewnić swobodny przepływ informacji  
i sprawiedliwy do niej dostęp za pośrednictwem tego medium. Środkiem służącym realizacji tego celu jest 
neutralność Internetu – regulacja prawna, nakazująca równe traktowanie wszystkich stron, platform i usług 
dostępnych w Sieci. Zabronione jest blokowanie dostępu, nakładanie dodatkowych opłat czy spowalnianie 
połączenia z określonymi adresami. Autor wykorzystał dorobek ekonomicznej nauki prawa (law and 
economics), w szczególności metodę behawioralną, służącą do oceny regulacji prawnych poprzez pryzmat 
spodziewanej reakcji społecznej, tj. zachowania adresatów analizowanej normy, przy założeniu, że kierują się oni 
racjonalną chęcią zrealizowania własnych interesów gospodarczych w maksymalnym stopniu. Dokonano 
przeglądu prezentowanych w piśmiennictwie argumentów, wysuwanych przez przedstawicieli nauk 
ekonomicznych, prawnych i informatycznych, zarówno przeciwników, jak i zwolenników neutralności Internetu,  
w szczególności uwzględniające specyfikę Internetu jako rynku dwustronnego. Krytyczna analiza przytoczonych 
poglądów doprowadziła autora do wniosku, że zaniechanie zasady neutralności Internetu stwarza warunki do 
tego, aby faworyzowane przez dostawców Internetu przedsiębiorstwa stały się w niezasłużony sposób bardziej 
konkurencyjne. To zwiększenie konkurencyjności nie wiązałoby się z wyższą jakością świadczonych usług czy 
niższą ceną, odbyłoby się więc z uszczerbkiem dla konsumentów. W konsekwencji mogą powstać nowe bądź 
umocnić się już istniejące monopole. Neutralność Internetu obowiązywała w latach 2015-2017 w USA, na 
podstawie rozporządzenia Federalnej Komisji Komunikacji, które zostało jednak uchylone.  
Słowa kluczowe:  neutralność Internetu, rynek dwustronny, konkurencyjność, monopol, Federalna 
Komisja Komunikacji 
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Introduction 
 
On the fourteenth of December 2017, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), a regulatory 
body tasked with overseeing the telecommunications 
industry in the United States of America, held a vote 
on the Commission's chairman's proposition to re-
peal the principle of net neutrality. The proposed 
change to the rules passed with a three-to-two mar-
gin, causing great controversy and bringing net neu-
trality into international spotlight. The repeal of net 
neutrality is  part of a broader campaign of deregulat-
ing various industries, spearheaded by the current 
presidential administration, the effects of which can 
be seen in healthcare, environmental protection and 
consumer protection. Net neutrality is both a com-
plex, economic, political and legal issue in its own 
right, as well as an element of a broader discussion 
on the validity of deregulating industries as a means 
of inducing growth. 
The goal of this paper is to examine the principle 
of net neutrality in the context of safeguarding com-
petition among companies and entrepreneurs utiliz-
ing the Internet as a venue for their business and to 
determine, whether it's beneficial to the market as a 
whole. To this end, various scholarly arguments, put 
forth by both opponets and proponents of net neu-
trality, shall be examined. 
 
Material and methods 
 
The author utilized scholarly writings, represent-
ing various sciences associated with the issue of net 
neutrality, namely the economic, legal and IT scienc-
es. This review included arguments put forth both by 
opponents, as well as proponents of the principle of 
net neutrality. 
The presented scholarly arguments pertained to 
the specific traits of the Internet as a two-sided mar-
ket, the impact net neutrality has on the competitive-
ness of Web-based enterprises, investment incen-
tives for Internet Service Providers and content pro-
viders, the viability of extra-regulatory means of en-
forcing net neutrality. 
Presented arguments were subjected to critical 
anlysis in order to determine, whether net neutrality 
has a significant impact on competition among com-
panies providing services on the Internet and what is 
the nature of this impact. 
Since the analyzed subject is a specific legal rule 
and its impact on a selected sector of the economy, 
the author has opted for the methodology specific to 
the legal science. For the purposes of this paper, 
achievements of the school of law and economics 
have been utilized, the behavioural method in partic-
ular. The method is used to examine legal rules 
through the prism of expected social response, i.e. 
behaviour of addressees of the rule being analyzed, 
with the assumption that they are guided by a ration-
al desire to fulfill their own economic interests to the 
fullest extent possible (Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler, 1998). 
 
Results and discussion 
 
In the most simple of terms, net neutrality is a le-
gal principle, prohibiting Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) from discriminating against lawful content 
available on the Internet. Such discrimination may 
involve slowing down (throttling) or outright blocking 
particular websites, services or applications (Lee, 
Wu, 2009, Cheng, Bandyopadhyay, Guo, 2011). 
Internet Service Providers are capable of such 
discrimination because of their control over the infra-
structure. An ISP's infrastructure network consists of 
multiple routers, which receive and transmit data 
packets. Should the number of data packets exceed 
the transmission limit of a router, the excess data is 
stored in a buffer. If the router runs out of buffer 
memory, some data packets must be discarded (Fel-
ten, 2006). An ISP may assign different levels of 
priority to different types of data packets, for  exam-
ple data originating from website A could be given 
higher priority than that of website B. Data packets 
with the highest level of priority would be the last to 
be discarded in the event of a router running out of 
buffer memory. This type of discrimination is called 
minimal discrimination (Felten, 2006), as it involves 
giving preferential treatment (“positive discrimina-
tion”) to certain data packets without directly handi-
capping the others. An ISP may also limit router 
capacity available to a particular type of data. In such 
an event, if discriminated data packets required net-
work capacity exceeding the arbitrary limitation (set 
as a percent of the total capacity), they would be 
discarded. This type of discrimination is called non-
minimal discrimination (Felten 2006). 
The distinction between minimal and non-minimal 
discrimination is relevant for discussing net neutrality. 
Minimal discrimination is unavoidable, simply be-
cause of the limited capacity of the available infra-
structure. However, the process of selecting data 
packets to be delayed or discarded ought to be 
based on objective and equitable criteria, like the time 
of transmission, with older data packets being given 
priority over newer ones. Non-minimal discrimination, 
on the other hand, is never justified from the techno-
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logical standpoint and is purely a result of economic or 
political factors. For the purposes of this paper, “dis-
crimination” is understood as “non-minial discrimina-
tion”. 
When discussing the market of services provided 
via the Internet, it is important to take into account 
the interests and mutual relationships of three 
groups: end users, content providers and ISPs. End 
users are customers, purchasing the various ser-
vices offered on the Internet. This group is diverse 
and includes regular and juridical persons, consum-
ers and entrepreneurs alike. Content providers are 
businesses which maintain contact with their con-
sumers using the Internet as a medium, for  exam-
ple: online shops, video on demand services (VOD), 
online gaming companies, Internet telephone ser-
vices. The term “content” should be defined broadly, 
as encompassing all types of media, applications, 
retailers, and services (Lee, Wu, 2009). Finally, ISPs 
facilitate the communications between the two 
aforementioned groups, by lending their infrastruc-
ture. 
Under the principle of net neutrality, ISPs serve 
merely as platform facilitators, charging both end 
users and content providers for the ability to engage 
in communications through their network infrastruc-
ture (Musacchio, Schwartz, Walrand, 2009). Such 
charges may include access fees as well as usage 
fees, depending on the period of access and the 
amount of used bandwidth (Lee, Wu, 2009). These 
charges are not, however, dependent on the type of 
service being provided or sought after. In particular, 
ISPs are not allowed to charge network participants 
(whether end users or content providers) specifically 
for reaching other participants. This solution is called 
the zero-price rule (Hemphill, 2008). A model em-
ploying the zero-price rule can be described as a 
neutral network regime (Musacchio, Schwartz, 
Walrand, 2009). On the other end of the spectrum 
would be a model in which ISPs are legally able to 
differentiate services, and charge different rates 
based on the type of service. This could manifest as 
charging end users and/or content providers more for 
engaging in a particular service or as lowering the 
quality of a particular service by throttling its data 
packets. A serious question could be raised about 
the compatibility of service differentiation with the 
right to free speech (see Chong, 2007 and Odlyzko, 
2008). In this context, also the issue of safeguarding 
the diversity of opinions, expressed by Web-based 
media, is noteworthy (Cheng, Bandyopadhyay, Guo, 
2011). However, for the purposes of this paper, the 
author is going to focus solely on the economic rami-
fications of this phenomenon. 
Services provided on the Internet constitute a 
two-sided market. A market of this type consists of 
the platform provider (ISPs) and two categories of 
participants (end users and content providers) (Mu-
sacchio, Schwartz, Walrand, 2009). In order to 
properly function, a two-sided market must attract an 
appropriate number of both end users and content 
providers (Hahn, Wallsten, 2006). Service differentia-
tion results in heightening the barrier of entry into the 
market for content providers and limits the accessibil-
ity of the market for end users, thus lowering the 
demand and disrupting competition. Limiting the 
number of end users able to purchase services on 
the Internet bodes ill for content providers, by lessen-
ing their opportunity to find customers. Levying addi-
tional charges on content providers will in turn trans-
late into higher prices for end users (as content pro-
viders will try to recoup their higher operating ex-
penses) and a decreased level of competition, as 
smaller businesses are unable to enter the market. 
A prevailing aspect of two-sided markets is the 
positive correlation between the increasing amount 
of participants and growth (Farrell, Garth, 1985, Katz, 
Shapiro, 1986, Liebowitz, Margolis, 1994). A greater 
amount of end users creates demand for services, 
while the increased number of content providers 
translates into fiercer competition, which drives the 
prices down and innovation up. Levying additional 
charges by the platform providers inevitably results in 
a decrease in the number of participants, slowing 
growth down. 
As with every market, growth in the Internet ser-
vices sector is heavily reliant on investments (Hahn, 
Wallsten, 2006). It is of paramount importance to 
create appropriate incentives and eliminate factors 
which might discourage investors. Levying no charg-
es on content providers, save for the cost of access-
ing and using the network, would provide the ultimate 
investment incentive, while pricing various services in 
a different manner would decrease investment in the 
more heavily priced sectors. Net neutrality should 
therefore be considered enticing to would-be content 
providers (Cheng, Bandyopadhyay, Guo, 2011). In 
fact, some scholars consider the zero-price rule to be 
a form of subsidy to content creators and one of the 
main factors creating the great wave of innovation in 
the sector of content creation and provision (Lee, 
Wu, 2009). It is important to note, that zero-price is 
different from low-price. Additional charges act as a 
deterrent for content creators not only because of 
their direct financial burden, but also because of the 
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administrative costs they cause (need to conduct 
negotiations, book-keeping etc), which is especially 
cumbersome to start-ups (Lee, Wu, 2009). 
Investment incentives ought to be considered not 
only from the content providers' perspective, but also 
from the point of view of the ISPs. In fact, net neutral-
ity opponents raise reduced investment incentives for 
ISPs as one of their main arguments (Pil Choi, Kim, 
2010). Their reasoning is based on the concept, that 
if ISPs are not allowed to levy additional charges on 
end users and content providers, on top of the price 
for accessing and using the network, the lower profits 
will not justify additional investments, resulting in a 
worse quality of infrastructure and services, feeble 
technological advancement and less competition. In 
fact, some opponents try to reduce the issue of net 
neutrality purely into a matter of price regulation 
(Hahn, Wallsten, 2006). However, it is a gross over-
simplification of the principle of net neutrality. Net neu-
trality regulations, by their definition, do not mandate 
prices, only the equal treatment of all end users and 
content providers. As long as ISPs charge all partici-
pants of the market in the same manner for the same 
access to the network, their conduct is compatible 
with the principle of net neutrality. In other words, 
they are free to set the prices as high as they like, on 
the condition that the same price applies to all. 
While establishing net neutrality is not a form of 
price regulation per se, it does indirectly drive down 
the cost of access to the network for end users and 
content providers. However, it should be noted, that 
this is a result of increased competition on the mar-
ket. Price reduction is a natural and desirable effect of 
competition. Artificially inflating prices simply to attract 
more investors would constitute a significant disruption 
of the market and create an investment bubble. Tak-
ing the abovementioned arguments into account, it 
should be noted, that the potential negative effect of 
net neutrality regulations on investment incentives for 
ISPs is minuscule (Pil Choi, Kim, 2010). 
Some opponents of net neutrality acknowledge, 
that the market of Internet services is susceptible to 
the establishment of monopolies, but they do not 
consider net neutrality to be a valid remedy, as they 
believe it is a form of price regulation (Hahn, 
Wallsten, 2006). It's hard to argue with the notion, 
that merely regulating prices is insufficient to combat 
and prevent monopolies. However, as it was argued 
above, the principle of net neutrality has little to do 
with prices. It merely lowers the barrier of entry for 
new content providers, thus increasing competition 
and both weakening the existing monopolies, as well 
as preventing new ones from being formed. 
Another argument put forth by opponents of net 
neutrality is that it constitutes an unwarranted inter-
vention of the state in the dealings of the market (the 
dreaded "overregulation"). Instead, they propose to 
focus on antitrust laws enforcement as a way of deal-
ing with monopolists among the ISPs and content 
providers (Hahn, Wallsten, 2006). Net neutrality and 
antitrust enforcement should never be a "one-or-the-
other" choice, as both can be simultaneously em-
ployed. Focusing solely on antitrust enforcement is 
not feasible, for a variety of reasons. Discrimination 
against data on the Internet is incredibly hard to de-
tect, as its effects are virtually indistinguishable from 
delays caused by legitimate technical issues (Felten, 
2006). Which is why policymakers should focus on 
preventing, not prosecuting this behaviour. Certain 
types of businesses offering their services on the 
Internet are especially vulnerable to data discrimina-
tion (video on demand, Internet phone services) 
(Felten, 2006). Preventing discrimination is vital to 
the existence of these companies. Lastly, while it is 
possible to prevent data discrimination utilizing extra-
regulatory measures, like data encryption, these are 
not fully effective and can never supplant laws and 
the supervision of regulatory bodies (Felten, 2006). 
As we have already established, the principle of 
net neutrality is not a form of price regulation and 
does not preclude ISPs from recouping their invest-
ments by charging network participants. The claim, 
that pricing end users and content providers for the 
access to other network participants is the only way 
for ISPs to profit from their infrastructure, is patently 
false (Economides, 2008), as ISPs already charge 
access and usage fees. 
The true reason for the ISPs opposition to net 
neutrality might very well be associated with expand-
ing their business activities into the field of content 
creation and provision. Multiple ISPs in the United 
States of America and worldwide became content 
providers as well. This expansion is being conducted 
on multiple fields, including search engines, news 
sites, e-mail hosting and, most notably, video on 
demand services. This turn of events creates a con-
flict of interest – ISP companies provide a platform 
for other content providers, despite being content 
providers themselves and thus competitors. 
ISPs engaging in content creation and provision 
might engage in discriminatory practices against 
entities offering similar services, for example an ISP 
with its own Internet phone service might discrimi-
nate against Internet phone companies utilizing its 
network (Felten, 2006). The abovementioned dis-
criminatory practices would be especially effective, 
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given that 98% of consumers in the United States of 
America have the choice between only two ISPs, or 
no choice at all (Economides, 2008). By effectively 
controlling, which services are available on the mar-
ket, an ISP might gain an unfair advantage (Cheng, 
Bandyopadhyay, Guo, 2011). Services provided by 
the ISP, or by an associated company, would be 
more competitive than services provided by third par-
ties, based solely on enjoying unlimited access to the 
infrastructure. This increase in competitiveness would 
not involve a higher quality of services or a lower 
price, so it would be achieved in an undeserved man-
ner and be detrimental to consumers. Therefore, 
discriminatory practices employed by ISPs would 
disrupt the proper working of market forces. 
The principle of net neutrality in the US had its 
basis in a rule adopted by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC). The FCC, acting within its 
area of competence specified in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, is empowered to adopt rules. 
These rules, pursuant to their publication in the Fed-
eral Register, become a part of federal law and thus 
are universally binding and enforceable in the US. In 
2015, a rule was adopted, extending the application 
of provisions contained within Title II of the Tele-
communications Act to ISPs, thereby instituting net 
neutrality. However, this solution was short-lived, as 
the rule was repealed a mere two years later. 
Pursuant to the provisions of the 1996 Congres-
sional Review Act, the US Congress provides over-
sight of the FCC and can repeal any rules adopted 
by the Commission. Given the Republican majorities 
in both chambers of Congress (Senate and the 
House of Representatives), and the willingness of 
some of the “business-friendly” Democrats to vote in 
lockstep with the Republicans, overriding the repeal 
of net neutrality seems improbable. 
The fight to save net neutrality continues on state 
and local levels, with various states, counties and 
municipalities adopting their own versions of net 
neutrality. This includes both states controlled by the 
Democrats (so called “blue states”, like California, 
Washington, Oregon) and by Republicans (some of 
the “red states”, for example Montana). The adopted 
measures can be divided into three categories: stat-
utes, executive orders and public broadband utilities. 
State legislatures in Alaska, California, Connecti-
cut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and 
Wisconsin introduced or passed bills containing pro-
visions establishing the principle of net neutrality. 
However, these statutes are likely to be sued by the 
FCC and become a subject of judicial review by the 
federal courts. This is due to the doctrine of preemp-
tion, which prohibits state governments from regulat-
ing areas which are already subject to federal regula-
tion, FCC rules in this case. State net neutrality stat-
utes are thus likely to be struck down by federal 
courts. 
Similarly to the President of the United States and 
the federal executive branch, state governors are 
chiefs of the executive branches of their respective 
state governments. As a result, governors may issue 
executive orders, detailing the organization and activ-
ity of various state agencies and bodies, including 
their choice of contractors. The Governors of Mon-
tana, New York and New Jersey issued executive 
orders, mandating the executive agencies of their 
states to utilize only the services of ISPs which do 
not engage in discriminatory practices. While not 
directly establishing net neutrality, these regulations 
force ISPs to de facto uphold this principle in order to 
pursue lucrative public contracts. 
Some local governments decided, that net neu-
trality can successfully be enforced only if there is a 
publicly owned network infrastructure. Numerous 
localities funded their own municipal broadband. Most 
recent examples are the cities of Longmont, Colorado, 
San Antonio, Texas and Seattle, Washington. 
The recent developments in the US exemplify the 
need to enshrine the principle of net neutrality in 
legal documents which are difficult to amend and 
repeal – at least statutes, preferably the constitution. 
Regulations adopted by executive agencies are too 
susceptible to lobbying, regulatory capture, and there 
is little political price to pay, since the legislative body 
is not directly involved. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Taking all of the abovementioned arguments into 
account, it is the author's opinion, that net neutrality 
is a pillar of competetivness in the Web-based mar-
ket. Abandoning the principle of net neutrality creates 
conditions for a grievious disruption of the market 
forces and is detrimental both to consumers and 
businesses. 
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